ABSTRACT This paper shows that strict evidentialism about normative reasons for belief is inconsistent with taking truth to be the source of normative reasons for belief. It does so by showing that there are circumstances in which one can know what truth requires one to believe, yet still lack evidence for the contents of that belief.
I. Introduction
Strict normative evidentialism is the view that all normative reasons for belief are evidential reasons. 1 In this paper, I show that the falsity of strict normative evidentialism-called 'evidentialism' from here forward-follows from weak and uncontroversial premises. I argue that none of the premises may be plausibly rejected, and thus that evidentialism is false. 2 There are various strategies available for resisting strict normative evidentialism. For the most part, opponents of evidentialism have taken one of two tacks. One is to defend one view or another about epistemic normativity that does not imply evidentialism, or that entails its falsehood. Some of these views, fairly or not, have gained so little traction that evidentialists have not felt much need to address them. 3 Others have generated an interesting but as yet inconclusive exchange. 4 The second strategy is to undermine the various positive arguments for evidentialism. 5 Proponents of particular arguments for evidentialism have generally not responded to objections to their particular arguments, 6 so it is difficult to know how effectively they might be able to defuse the various worries that have been raised about their views.
Both of these strategies for developing objections to evidentialism are, taken on their own, in a dialectically disadvantageous position. The view of many philosophers is that evidentialism is obviously true, and therefore the outstanding philosophical task is to explain why, rather than whether, this is so. We can see, given the state of the dialectic, why undermining the positive arguments for evidentialism may not provoke much of a response, if the undermining is done with the aim of suggesting that evidentialism is false. The defenders of evidentialism do not, or often do not, see its falsehood as a live, or at least an interesting, possibility. The state of the dialectic also makes it difficult for other views about the source of reasons for belief, such as instrumentalism or pragmatism, to take hold. Given that the default view is that evidentialism is true, alternative views face a heavy burden of proof to show that they are more likely to be correct.
The state of the dialectic is not an accident. For the case of common empirical beliefs, evidentialism works very well. It works so well and seems so intuitive that it is easy to think that it must be the right general view about reasons for belief-not only for the most common empirical cases, but ultimately for all types of belief. While this second thought may seem like a natural one to draw from the first, it certainly in no way follows from it. What we might think of as standard cases, i.e. ordinary empirical beliefs, just are those cases that are most congenial to evidentialism. In a way, what it is to be a standard case is to be a belief of the kind governed by evidential normative reasons. 3 For example, Stich, The Fragmentation of Reason. Stich defends universal pragmatism about normative reasons for belief. A more recent appraisal of universal pragmatism's prospects may be found in Reisner 'Pragmatic Reasons for Belief'. 4 The most important of these is the debate concerning instrumentalism about normative reasons for belief. A sophisticated and fair-minded discussion of the issues may be found in Lockard, 'Epistemic Instrumentalism', 1701-18. 5 There are two main classes of positive argument for evidentialism. Those belonging to the first try to derive evidentialism from two other claims: that ought implies can and from direct doxastic involuntarism. Adler, Belief's Own Ethics; Kelly, 'The Rationality of Belief', and Pojman, 'Believing and Willing', [37] [38] [39] [40] [41] [42] [43] [44] [45] [46] [47] [48] [49] [50] [51] [52] [53] [54] [55] [56] However, for evidentialism-strict evidentialism-to be true, the evidentialist must show that it is not only the standard case to which only evidential reasons for belief apply, but to all cases. Otherwise, evidentialism ceases to be strict, and it becomes the unsurprising view that beliefs apt to be governed by evidential reasons are governed by evidential reasons, while beliefs not apt to be governed by evidential reasons are not governed by evidential reasons, but reasons of another kind.
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The argumentative strategy in this paper is to block the extension of evidentialism to at least one kind of empirical belief. Some evidentialists engage in special pleading about non-empirical beliefs.
8 Although I am sceptical about this as a methodology, I have tried to be concessive to it by choosing an example involving ordinary empirical beliefs with straightforward truth-conditions and straightforward truth-makers. I have also avoided appeals to exotic accounts of normative reasons for belief, such as instrumentalism or pragmatism in the argument.
9 Instead, I rely only on accepting a weaker version of the truth norm for reasons for belief than that which evidentialists already embrace.
II. Unstable Beliefs with Many Fixed Points
Evidentialism looks most at home when accounting for our reasons to believe empirical truths. It is therefore surprising that evidentialism cannot provide reasons to believe some empirical truths that there are clearly reasons to believe. A thought experiment shows one type of empirical truth for which evidentialism cannot provide a reason. I call this thought experiment 'the many fixed points numbers game'.
Before turning to the thought experiment, it should be noted that the version presented here is a refinement of a simpler thought experiment that I developed some years back, 10 which I called 'the numbers game'. The original thought experiment and the present one differ importantly in a single respect: the many fixed points numbers game has more than one fixed point, whereas the original numbers game has a single fixed point. This difference turns out to be rather significant, for reasons that I shall explain after presenting the experiment. Indeed, while I believe that the original version of the experiment and the discussion that follow are still of interest, it has become clear to be in the intervening years that evidentialists have at least a possible avenue of response to the original single fixed point version of the numbers game. I shall take this issue up again in Section IV. Here is the many fixed points numbers game.
Alice is the subject of a psychology experiment. She knows all of its rules and parameters. The experiment goes as follows: Alice is attached to a computer that can read her doxastic states with complete accuracy and with complete reliably. In front of her is a screen that is connected to the computer. Alice is asked to predict what number will appear on the screen. The rules (of which Alice is fully aware) for generating this number are as follows:
(1) The computer will scan for Alice's belief, if she has one, about what number will appear on the screen, and then after a one-minute delay, will put up a number on the screen based on Alice's belief about what number will appear on the screen. The computer determines what number will appear on the screen in the following way: Let n be the number that Alice believes will appear on the screen. If n ≥ 0, then the number that will appear on the screen is ½n + 1. If n < 0, then the number that will appear on the screen is ½n − 1. If Alice changes her belief during the delay, the computer will take ½n + 1 or ½n − 1, as appropriate, of the new number and display it instead one minute from the change of belief. This process is iterated until Alice forms a stable belief.
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(2) If Alice suspends judgement, has multiple beliefs about what number will appear on the screen, believes that multiple numbers will appear on the screen, has a disjunctive belief about what number will appear on the screen, or has a belief that is a category error (e.g. that the number 'Herbert' will appear on the screen), then the number 16 will appear on the screen.
Two final remarks should be made about Alice. She has no particular dispositions concerning what to believe about what number will appear on the screen, nor does she have any beliefs about her dispositions to have beliefs about what number will appear on the screen. And Alice's relevant mental states are luminous to her. 12 The former point is of special importance, given the discussion of evidence below. If Alice had, or believed that she had, a disposition to believe that the number on the screen will be 2, then she would have evidence that the number on the screen will be 2 (given that her belief would cause that result).
11 This procedure applies only in the case where Alice has a single belief about what number will appear on the screen, and her belief concerns a specific, single number (i.e. not a disjunctive belief or a belief just that some unidentified number will appear).
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This elaborated version of this thought experiment originally appeared in Reisner, The Aim of Belief, 168-83. The argument that accompanies it is new. Given these parameters, Alice can see that there are only two fixed points and hence only two stable belief states: that the number on the screen will be 2 (½ × 2 + 1 = 2), or that the number on the screen will be −2 (½ × −2 − 1 = −2). Suspension of judgement or any other failure to form a precise numerical belief about what number will appear on the screen would not be stable, because Alice will know that, having suspended judgement, the number on the screen will be 16. Assuming for the sake of argument that she will make the relevant inference (and knows that she will do so), then Alice will infer from her having suspended judgement that the number on the screen will be 16, thereby leading her to form the belief that the number on the screen will be 16. Having formed that belief, she knows that the computer will rescan, and the number will be 9 (½ × 16 + 1 = 9), and then this pattern will repeat indefinitely.
III. Fixed Points and Permissibility
Intuitively, it is permissible for Alice to believe that the number that will appear on the screen will be 2, and it is permissible for Alice to believe that the number on the screen will be −2. To be precise: Permissible (believe 2 or believe −2) and~Permissible (believe 2 and −2).
Intuitively, too, it is impermissible for Alice to believe that the number that will appear on the screen is any particular number apart from 2 or −2, and it is impermissible for Alice to suspend judgement or not to have a specific numerical belief. To be precise:
Let y be a particular number (or multiple numbers, or other content), other than 2 (and nothing else) or −2 (and nothing else), that will appear on the screen. and Not permissible (believe y or suspend judgement).
We should accept the following inference pattern:
(1) Necessarily (a ↔ b). This inference pattern would be a semantic consequence of a deontic logic that treated propositions as sets of possible worlds, and it is consistent with other standard accounts of propositions. It also holds for any variant of standard deontic logic, but it is plausible independently of whether or not one endorses SDL. Importantly, the inference in the case of necessary co-extension does not fall prey to the counterexamples that undermine the unidirectional cousin of this inference pattern, sometimes called deontic inheritance.
Applying this inference pattern, we can generate a new argument for an ought rather than a weaker permission:
Let p be that you believe that the number on the screen will be 2, and you only have that belief about the number that will appear on the screen; or you believe that the number on the screen will be −2, and you only have that belief about the number that will appear on the screen.
Let q be that you suspend judgement or that your belief about what number will appear on the screen is something other than the belief that it will be 2 and nothing else or the belief that it will be −2 and nothing else.
(
14 Not permissible not p is the equivalent of ought p. Oughts are stronger than reasons, and ought p implies normative reason for p. If one (epistemically) ought to believe b, then one has a normative epistemic reason to believe b. The reverse, of course, is not the case. So, even on the weak assumption that one is permitted to believe that either of the fixed points will appear on the screen and is not permitted to suspend judgement or to have other beliefs about what number will appear on the screen, there is an epistemic reason to believe that one of the fixed points will appear on the screen.
IV. Explaining the Permission
In the previous section, I observed that it was intuitive that it was permissible to believe either of the fixed points in the many fixed point numbers game experiment. A more substantial explanation can be offered. We should accept a principle, negative knowledge:
Negative Knowledge: If you know that p is false, then you are not permitted to believe p.
And we should also accept non-suspension: Non-suspension: If you know that p is the case, then you are not permitted to suspend judgment towards p.
Negative knowledge follows from the factivity of knowledge and from a weak interpretation of the more general view that epistemic normative reasons for belief are truth derived. Non-suspension follows from the same. The interpretation of the truth norm for belief required here is weaker than is required for evidentialism, because knowledge is more secure than evidence. There can be misleading evidence, but knows p entails p. Negative knowledge rules out believing anything other than one of the fixed points. Non-suspension rules out suspending judgement, because one knows that suspension of judgement will result in the number 16 appearing on the screen.
Believing either of the fixed points is not ruled out by either of these principles. So, it is permissible to believe either of the fixed points. At the same time, there is no evidence, given the stipulations of the thought experiment, that Alice will believe that the number on the screen will be 2 in particular, or that she will believe that number on the screen will be −2 in particular. Since it is Alice's actual belief that determines which number appears on the screen, only evidence concerning what Alice will believe can serve as evidence for what number will appear on the screen. Thus, the permissibility does not derive from evidential considerations.
It is this last conclusion that cannot be drawn from the original version of the numbers game, in which there is a single fixed point. Evidentialists need not be committed to a very rigid view about what constitutes evidence. A common way of thinking about evidence is the following:
Simple evidence: E is evidence for x if and only if the conditional probability of x given E is higher than the conditional probability of x given not E.
However, evidentialists could slacken their notion of evidence in various ways, the details of which are of no special importance here. What is important is that the slackening be able to track the single fixed point in the numbers game. Because there is a unique solution to the original numbers game, one might expect the right theory of evidence to point to it. 15 Thought of in this way, the original version of the numbers game is a challenge to particular theories of evidence-the right theory of evidence has to track the fixed point solution to the numbers game-rather than to evidentialism itself. Generically, the theory of evidence must entail that the fact that the belief that p is the only possible true belief is evidence for p.
16 Although I am sceptical about the prospects for it, I have no argument that a reasonable theory of evidence could not have this entailment. So, the original version of the numbers game no longer seems persuasive to me.
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The suggestion that evidentialists might adopt this strategy has been made to me by several people. Jeff Speaks, in particular, persuaded me that this might be a reasonable response to the single fixed point example.
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I discuss this issue in more detail in the earlier paper. See Reisner, 'Evidentialism and the Numbers Game', No such out is available for the many fixed points numbers game, because there is no unique solution. One might wonder whether a theory of evidence could be further slackened to include cases with more than one fixed point. It is difficult to see how, while still maintaining any substance to the notion of evidence. Of course, the evidentialist could just stipulate that there is evidence in such cases, but argument by definition would not be a particularly satisfying response.
V. Conclusion
I have shown in this paper that the falsity of strict normative evidentialism, even for beliefs concerning empirical truths, follows from a set of uncontroversial premises. This conclusion is consistent with the weaker view, that in cases to which evidential reasons apply, they are the only applicable reasons. At best, then, slack normative evidentialism may be a correct view about normative reasons for belief, but evidence cannot do enough work to support strict evidentialism about normative reasons for belief.
